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Abstract
This paper addresses arguments that a system of fiscal insurance between member states of
theEuropeanUnionisneededtoactinreplacementofnominalexchangerateflexibility asanau-
tomaticstabilizer undermonetary union. Many authorshavearguedorassumedthatasymmetric
realmacroeconomicfluctuationsposeanimportantthreat tothesuccessofmonetary unification
andthat somemanner of fiscal insuranceismissing fromplanstocopewithacommoncurrency.
A theoretical model economy in which production is subject to asymmetric national shocks is
usedtoanalyze the benefitsof fiscal insurance for allocative efficiency under monetary union in
comparison with resource allocation under a flexible nominal exchange rate regime. It is shown
that whether national markets in goods and services are arbitraged or there is pricing-to-market
matters for assessing the usefulness of fiscal insurance for efficiency as well as for assessing the
macroeconomic costs of monetary union. This paper argues that the benefits of fiscal insurance
for allocative efficiency may be increased little by monetary unification. Fiscal insurance may
not be an essential or even desirable companion to a common currency.
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Discussions of the economic case for or against European monetary unification inevitably
concern the concept of an optimum currency area. By the classic definition of Mundell [1961],
a group of states form an optimum currency area if the permanent fixing of nominal rates of ex-
change between them has no effects on real economic variables. This is the case if all prices and
wages are perfectly flexible, or as pointed out by Mundell, all factors are perfectly mobile even
if there are nominal price or wage rigidities. If labor market adjustment is sluggish, then nom-
inal exchange rate movements can be a stabilizing tool in the presence of asymmetric national
productivity or demand disturbances.1
Eichengreen[1992b], Bayoumi andEichengreen[1993]andothershavefocusedtheanalysis
of the macroeconomic effects of the monetary unification of Europe on comparisons between
the European Union and the United States.2 These studies compare the degree of interregional
labor mobility and of the incidence of idiosyncratic regional aggregate supply and demand dis-
turbancesbetweentheUnitedStates(andCanada) andtheEuropeanUnion. Aconclusionisthat
Europe may be a more problematic candidate for monetary unification, although it is difficult
to compare regional real disturbances for an established monetary union with those experienced
under a flexible exchange regime with separate national monetary policies.
Nominal exchange rate flexibility allows autonomous monetary policy responses to idiosyn-
cratic aggregate fluctuations and allows nations to pursue different goals of stabilization policy.
By adopting a common currency, the European Union appears to be placing a greater burden
on fiscal policies for achieving differential responses to productivity and demand disturbances,
whether these are common or region-specific. Economists differ widely in their views on the
justification and prospects for success of a European monetary union. McKinnon [1997], for
example, argues that fiscal discipline imposed by the disestablishment of national central banks
on national governments provides a strong justification for monetary union.3 Feldstein [1997]
argues that a system of floating exchange rates is desirable for Europe due to differing political
goals and sluggish labor market adjustment.2
The recent policy debate on monetary unification also notes that the United States supple-
ments a single monetary policy with a system of fiscal federalism. Interstate transfers through
the federal tax system and transfer payments automatically stabilize spending power against
idiosyncratic regional shocks as observed by Ingram [1959].4 Therefore, many authors suggest
that successful European monetary unification may require fiscal consolidation as well.5 In this
paper, I use a formal general equilibrium model to discuss the potential role for fiscal insurance
between member states of a monetary union to act in a replacement of nominal exchange rate
flexibility for short-run stabilization in the presence of asymmetric real shocks.
An analytical model of an international economy in which financial asset markets are inte-
grated but labor markets are not is used to compare the welfare benefits of a system of state-
contingentfiscaltransferswithandwithout monetary union. Temporary nominalwagerigidities
provide a role for monetary policies to alleviate short-run labor market disequilibrium caused
by productivity shocks that can differ across countries. The elimination of nominal exchange
rate flexibility with monetary union reduces the capacity of monetary authorities to influence
resource allocation in the model economy. The model is analyzed in stages, adding structure
as needed to discuss possible rationale for the argument that fiscal insurance is needed to act in
replacement for independent monetary policies after monetary unification.
Fiscal insurance is first discussed in a standard model of international portfolio diversifi-
cation under perfect price and wage flexibility and idiosyncratic national productivity shocks.
Asset markets are incomplete because assets capitalizing future labor earnings are not tradable.
The flexible price allocation of resources can be replicated when nominal rigidities are added
to the economy under independent national monetary policies. This provides a benchmark case
for discussing the gains from fiscal insurance with monetary union. It is argued that empirical
evidencesuggeststhat fiscal insuranceschemesareunlikely togenerate significantwelfareben-
efits in the benchmark economy. Fiscal insurance schemes are most important when monetary
policies are effective for reducing short-run labor market disequilibrium and prices in national
markets for goods and services are arbitraged across borders. Empirical evidence shows that3
goods and services are priced-to-market, so that these markets are segmented across member
states of the European Union. The model reveals that the failure of the law of one price greatly
reducesboththe welfare benefitsof fiscal insurance under monetary unionandthe welfare costs
of monetary unification with nominal rigidities and asymmetric productivity disturbances.
In the model, consumption, saving, labor supply, money demand and portfolio allocation de-
cisions are made by households optimizing over time. Investment and employment decisions
are made by firms seeking to maximize their value. Nominal wage and price rigidities are in-
troduced in a simple and, necessarily, ad hoc fashion following the literature on overlapping
nominal wage contracts. The next section presents the basic model of international asset trade
with asymmetric productivity risk and discusses state-contingent fiscal transfers under flexi-
ble prices. Section 3 introduces nominal rigidities and discusses the comparison benchmark of
resource allocation with nominal exchange rate flexibility. The welfare gains and losses from
fiscal insurance with integrated goods markets are discussed in Section 4 and with segmented
goods markets in Section 5. The last section concludes.
2. Fiscal transfers with nominal flexibility
Behind arguments in favor of a system of fiscal transfers between members of a monetary
union is the incompleteness of markets to share the risk of idiosyncratic disturbances to national
productivities. Even with the highly integrated international financial markets of the European
Union, labor income risk is largely uninsurable across borders. Aggregate labor income risk
is the focus of concerns about asymmetric disturbances to real economic performance in the
European Union. A natural starting point for a welfare analysis of fiscal insurance schemes is
a model of incomplete international asset markets without nominal wage or price rigidities. A
simple model is used in this section to show how the uninsurability of national labor income
risk can lead to a welfare argument for intergovernmental fiscal insurance schemes. It is also
used to argue, on the basis of empirical evidence, that the welfare benefits of fiscal federalism
in Europe may be minor.4
The basic model is a variant of the Lucas [1982] model of international portfolio diversifi-
cation. A two-country model is used for illustration. In each country, there is a representative
resident household. A single tradable good is produced using capital and labor under constrant
returns to scale in each country. Factor productivity is subject to stochastic disturbances that
are independent across countries. Households can trade equity claims to the earnings of capital
and riskless bonds, but there is no asset market on which to trade claims to future wage income.
Therefore, households diversify their portfolios through purchases of internationally traded eq-
uities and bonds to reduce their exposure to productivity risk. They may be unable to share
fully idiosyncratic productivity risks internationally because labor income is not capitalized by
tradable assets. 6
The equations of the model are only shown for the home country whenever the equations
for the foreign country are analogous. Home variables do not carry superscripts and foreign
variables are indicated by an asterisk. The home country household supplies labor at each date t
in the amount `t earning a real wage given by wt ´ Wt
Pt , where Wt and Pt are the nominal wage
and price, respectively. It can hold bonds denominated in units of the single good, nominally-
indexedbonds,moneyandequity claims. Thesingle-periodbudgetidentity forthehomecountry
household at time t is given by
Wt
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Here, bt and Bt are the household’s holdings of single-period bonds at the beginning of period
t denominated in units of output and currency, respectively. Mt¡1denotes the nominal money
balances it carries forward from period t ¡ 1. Vt is the total market value of equities issued
by home country firms, ex dividend, at time t, and dt is the corresponding dividend paid at
the beginning of period t. The share of outstanding home country equities held by the home
household at the beginning of period t equals °t, and its share of foreign equities equals °¤
t,
where 0 · °t;°¤
t · 1. Purchases of home and foreign equities in period t equal °t+1Vt and5
°¤
t+1V ¤
t , respectively. The household’s consumption is ct, and Mt equals the money balances
held in period t.
Thehouseholdmakesitsconsumption, laborsupply, savingandportfolioallocationdecisions
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which is assumed for convenience to be additively separable in consumption, real balances and



















although preferences can otherwise differ across borders.
Householdutility maximizationwithrespecttoholdingsofreal-indexedbondsgivesthestan-
dard Euler condition for riskless bonds,
u
0(ct) = (1 + rt+1)Et¯u
0(ct+1): (4)
The choice of holdings of nominally-indexed bonds leads to another Euler condition,
u




Combining these gives the consumption-based Fisher interest parity condition,
(1 + rt+1)Et¯u























; for 0 < °t+1 < 1; (8)













; for 0 < °
¤
t+1 < 1; (9)
for foreign equities. Similar conditions hold for the optimal portfolio allocations for foreign6









; for 0 < °t+1 < 1; (10)
for example.
































The household makes its labor supply decision so that the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween leisure and goods consumption equals the real wage rate,
À
0(` ¡ `t) = wtu
0(ct): (13)
Thehouseholdoptimumalsosatisfiesthetransversality condition, sothatthesolvency condition
for the household sector holds with equality.
The home country aggregate production function is given by
Yt = µtF(·t;`t) = `tµtf(kt) (14)
where ·t is the capital stock, `t is employment and µt is a stochastic productivity disturbance.
The capital-labor ratio is kt ´ ·t=`t. Under perfect competition in the domestic labor market,
labor demand is determined by marginal productivity,
wt = µt(f(kt) ¡ ktf
0(kt)): (15)
Firms choose their investment levels to maximize shareholder value net of the cost of capital.
Along with the equilibrium conditions for asset demands, equations 8 and 10, this implies that
u
0(ct) = Et [¯u
0(ct+1)(1 + µt+1f
0(kt+1))]; (16)













if foreign residents do. With perfect international financial capital mobility, the expected mar-7








In equilibrium, the equities are valued according to the standard capital asset pricing model
equations.
It is useful to begin with the (well-known) efficient allocation for this model economy. A
welfare optimum can be implemented by a market equilibrium if tradable equities capitalize all
of gross domestic product. In the case that u(c) displays constant relative risk aversion, home
country residents will hold claims to the same share of GDP in each country. This share is equal
to the home country’s initial share of total financial wealth. In this case, there is no net trade in
either real-indexed or nominally-indexed bonds in equilibrium. If the two countries begin with
equal wealth, then the residents of each hold exactly half of the claims on GDP for each country.
Under the assumption only claims to the share of GDP paid to non-human factors are trad-
able, the efficient allocation can be supported in a market equilibrium only if the share of labor
payments in national product is less than the share of national wealth in total wealth. This must
hold for each country. If this is the case, then the residents of each country can select portfolios
that give them equal proportionate shares of the output of each country. To do this the portfolio
shares, °t and °¤
t, must satisfy the equalities,
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t) = (1 ¡ °t)®t; (20)
for 0 · °t · 1 and 0 · °¤





are capital’s share in national income for the home and foreign countries, respectively. Here,
(°t®t + (1 ¡ ®t)) is the fraction of home output that is paid to home residents, and °¤
t®¤
t is the
fraction of foreign output paid to home residents. For an efficient allocation, these are equal
to the home share in total initial wealth. If factor shares are the same in the two countries, an
efficient allocation of risk impliesthat householdswill hold a larger share of foreign capital than
of home capital equity. This follows because households already hold claims to domestic output8
via labor income shares. Equation 19 requires that home residents hold a larger share of claims
to the output of each country than labor earns in national output. Equation 20 states that this
must also hold for the foreign country.
For trade in capital equities and bonds to implement the efficient allocation, labor’s share in
each country must be less than that countries share of total wealth of the monetary union. For
N countries with equal initial wealth, this means that labor’s share in national product must be
less than 1/N. Efficient diversification of idiosyncratic national productivity risk is not possible
without tradable claims to future labor income for actual values of labor’s share around seventy
percent.
For realistic factor shares, the model implies that diversification goes as far as it can with
the assets available to households. Using equations 19 and 20, the share of labor for the home
country exceeds home residents share of foreign output, (1 ¡ ®t) > °¤
t®¤
t, so that °t = 0 in the
solution for the equilibrium. For the foreign country, we have that (1 ¡ ®¤
t) > (1 ¡ °t)®t and
°¤
t = 0. This means that home residents receive a higher share of income fromhome production
than from foreign production in equilibrium. All home earnings for home residents, however,
will be in the form of labor income for a constrained equilibrium. This is implied by the Euler
equations for capital assets, 11 and 12, with dividends calculated as capital earnings. That is,
home residents would like to trade away more of the claims to national GDP they hold than they
can by trading claims to capital alone.
When the constraint on international risk sharing imposed by the absence of assets in future
laborincomebinds,themarginalrateofsubstitutionbetweendatetanddatet+1consumptionis
not perfectly correlated across countries (as it would be for efficiency with constant relative risk
aversion). In particular, the marginal productivity of home country capital will have a higher
covariance with home country consumption than with foreign country consumption. There-
fore, the general model of international portfolio diversification predicts that domestic residents
would only hold claims to foreign capital and that all claims to domestic capital would be held
by foreigners. Thispredictionisinsharpcontrastwithwhat weobservefor the member statesof9
the European Union. Also, note that in equilibrium with incomplete risk sharing, net holdings
of internationally traded riskless bonds will not necessarily be zero as in the efficient allocation.
An international transfer scheme that promotesallocative efficiency can be designed torepli-
cate the consumption path for each household in equilibrium with assets based on total national
income. In such a scheme, the home country makes a gross transfer to the foreign country equal
to the difference between the share of home output foreign residents would be paid under effi-
cient risk sharing and the capital income they actually receive with incomplete asset markets.
The foreign country makes a similar gross transfer to the home country. The net transfers give
the residents of each country the same share of output for the monetary union as they would
receive in the efficient allocation. That is, all asymmetric risk is shared. Therefore, the returns
to capital and levels of investment will be the same under this transfer scheme as in the efficient
equilibrium. Algebraically, the equilibrium lump-sum transfer net of tax to the home household
under thisscheme at each date isgivenby the difference between the grosstransfer receivedand
that paid as






t ¡ [(1 ¡ ®t) ¡ ¹]Yt; (21)
where¹istheshareofhomeinitialwealthintotalwealth. Outputandfactorinputsareevaluated
in equilibrium. This is a balanced-budget scheme, as ¿t = ¿¤
t for all dates t.
The portfolio diversification model with the realistic assumption that financial claims to fu-
ture labor income cannot be traded provides a welfare argument for fiscal insurance schemes
between countries. So far, all prices and wages are assumed to be perfectly flexible, and the
equilibrium is Walrasian. The nominal exchange regime does not affect the welfare analysis
until nominal price or wage rigidity in introduced in the next section. Therefore, monetary
unification does not affect these benchmark welfare gains from international fiscal insurance
schemes. Before introducing nominal priceor wage rigidity tothe model, it isuseful to consider
how strong this welfare case is.
The model shows that international fiscal insurance can yield welfare benefits in competitive
equilibrium when international asset markets are incomplete. Potential Pareto benefits arise if10
residents seek to share more idiosyncratic national productivity risk than they can by trading eq-
uitiestocapital only. International fiscal insurance iswelfareimproving only whentheresidents
of at least one country hold only equities in foreign capital income and foreigners hold all the
equities in home capital income. Because fiscal insurance replaces trade in equities based on
labor’s share in GDP , the gains from fiscal insurance are the same as the gains from trading addi-
tional claims to grossdomestic product. If we observe that domestic residents hold net claims to
domestic capital in internationally integratedfinancial capital markets, then we should conclude
that the gains from fiscal insurance schemes are nil.
Many authors (for example, Tesar [1995] among others) have noted the strong home bias in
asset holding patterns for the advanced industrialized countries. This observation contradicts
the model prediction that is necessary under perfect capital mobility for fiscal insurance to be
desirable. Cole and Obstfeld [1991] and by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland [1992] have estimated
the gains from international risk sharing among the advanced industrialized countries to be very
small. Therefore, the diversification of productivity risk with fully flexible prices and wages
does not appear to provide a substantial basis for implementing fiscal insurance schemes to
make up for the absence of complete markets for sharing asymmetric labor income risk between
member states of the European Union.
3. Nominal rigidities and the role of exchange rate flexibility
Inthemodel so far, thelabor market clearsevery periodineachcountry. Productivity shocks,
however, can have a larger impact on output if real wages do not adjust to clear the labor mar-
ket each period. With nominal wage or price stickiness, monetary policy has real effects and
can be used actively to influence the output response to idiosyncratic national productivity dis-
turbances. Nominal rigidities also mean that the exchange rate regime matters. The capacity
of monetary policies to promote labor market equilibrium with imperfect international labor
mobility and idiosyncratic productivity disturbances is reduced by the adoption of a common
currency. By permanently fixing nominal exchange rates, monetary unification eliminates the11
role of nominal exchange rates between member states as automatic stabilizers of employment
and incomes against asymmetric national productivity shocks. National monetary authorities
lose the ability to influence national employment, consumption and investment independently
of other member states. This suggests that the welfare case for international fiscal insurance
may be increased by the creation of a monetary union.
To assess how monetary unification affects the gains from fiscal transfer schemes, nominal
wage rigidities are added to the model of international portfolio diversification with asymmetric
productivity shocks. I then discuss resource allocation under nominal exchange rate flexibility.
This provides the comparison case for discussing the argument that fiscal insurance is needed
to compensate for the loss of nominal exchange rate flexibility with monetary union.
A simple way to introduce nominal rigidities is to assume that nominal wages are set one
period in advance of employment. This could be extended to allow for infinitely forward and
backward looking nominal wage contracts as explored in Jensen [1998]. Eliminating immedi-
ate real wage adjustment to shocks to the marginal productivity of labor leads to labor market
disequilibrium. Therefore, some assumption must be made about how employment and out-
put are determined. Adding nominal wage rigidity to the model of the previous section, it is
assumed that employment is demand determined each period, as is done in the monopolistic
general equilibrium model used by Obstfeld and Rogoff [1995] and Corsetti and Pesenti [1998].
A significant amount of algebra is avoided by sticking with the perfectly competitive market
structure for producers.
The home nominal wage rate is set by firms at date t ¡ 1so that
Wt = Et¡1[ptµt(f(kt) ¡ ktf
0(kt))]; (22)
where Wt is the nominal wage rate and pt equals the nominal price of output. The capital-labor
ratio, kt = ·t=`d
t, depends on employment, `d
t, chosen at time t and on the capital stock, ·t,
chosen in period t ¡ 1. Therefore, kt depends on the state of nature, µt. Employment demand,
`d
t, at date t is chosen by firms ex post for each realization of ptµt so that the pre-determined12
nominal wage rate equals the nominal value marginal product of labor,
Wt = ptµt (f(kt) ¡ ktf
0(kt)): (23)








that the opportunity cost of money in terms of consumption equals the marginal rate of sub-


















where s denotes the spot exchange rate. Equation 25 is derived by adding bonds nominally-
indexed to each currency to the household budget constraint, equation 1. This leads to two
versions of the bond Euler condition, equation 5, one in terms of each currency. Combining
these conditionsyieldsthisarbitragecondition, whichholdswithequality becauseasset markets
are assumed to allow trade in bonds denominated in either currency. Counterparts to equations
22, 23, 24 and 25 for the foreign country are similar. With a single good, pt and Pt are identical,
andbothareexpressedinunitsof thehomecurrency. Withseveralgoods, Pt istheconsumption-
based price index for the home country and pt is the price of a home output. The price level is
determined by requiring saddle-path stability and ruling out speculative bubbles.
It is first assumed that exchange-rate pass-through is complete, so that the law of one price




Consider an adverse output realization (µt less than its mean) for the home country and a
positive one for the foreign country. In equilibrium, current home income falls so that home real
consumption falls (relative to its value for a mean output realization). Consumption smoothing,
implied by household optimization over time, implies that consumption is lower in both periods
t and t + 1. In a stable equilibrium for the model, the home price level and the exchange rate
rise to their expected future levels if both the home and foreign money supplies are held con-13
stant. The foreign price level falls. With nominal wage adjustment in one-period, overshooting
or undershooting of the exchange rate does not occur in a saddle-stable equilibrium. Because
nominal wages are preset, the adverse productivity shock for the home country leads to an in-
sufficiency of labor demand relative to labor supply at a constant nominal output price. The
opposite occurs in the foreign country for p¤ constant. Nominal rigidities exacerbate the output
effects of productivity shocks. The adjustment of nominal prices, p and p¤, can at least partially
offset these additional fluctuations to output. These changes are in opposing directions, so that
nominal exchange rate flexibility is essential for this automatic stabilizing effect to work. The
nominal exchange rate is also an automatic stabilizer under longer term nominal contracting
regimes.
Independent monetary policies can be used to exploit this adjustment process. With pre-
determined nominal wages, but flexible goods prices, independent expansions or contractions
of national money supplies lower or raise the real wage rate faced by each firm in the current
period. Nominal exchangerate flexibility allowsthe two monetary authorities(before monetary
union) to expand employment and output separately in the two countries to satisfy, ex post, the
two equilibrium conditions for labor-market clearing necessary for a Walrasian equilibrium:
À0(` ¡ `t)
u0(ct)















































Along with all the other equilibrium conditions, these choices of endogenous money sup-
ply responses to productivity shocks yield a, possibly constrained, efficient equilibrium allo-
cation of risks and resources. The constraint that may be binding is that household portfolio
diversification is limited by the absence of international trade in assets based on labor income
exactly as in the previous section. International monetary coordination that seeks to maintain
labor market equilibrium in each country in every period achieves all the same equilibrium
conditions for the model under perfectly flexible prices and wages. The equilibrium alloca-
tion and relative prices under trade in capital income securities and in riskless real-indexed and14
nominally-indexed bonds are the same. That is, nominal exchange rate flexibility allows en-
dogenous money supply reaction functions to implement the flexible price equilibrium despite
nominal wage rigidity. This implies that the welfare benefits of a fiscal insurance scheme are
the same in this flexible exchange rate regime as in the Walrasian equilibrium.
This gives a benchmark for discussing how the welfare benefits of fiscal insurance are in-
creased by monetary unification. The empirical results that actual asset portfolios are not diver-
sified internationally to the extent predicted by a competitive equilibrium model also implies
that fiscal insurance schemes would not provide notable welfare improvements under flexible
exchange rates.
Theefficacy of monetary policy inthismodelderivesfromtheresultthatnominalbutnotreal
wages are rigid in the short run. When nominal wages are de facto indexed to nominal prices,
monetary policies are ineffective for adjusting employment demand to clear the labor market
in response to productivity shocks. Therefore, the larger is the proportion of goods prices that
are preset along with wages, the less important and useful is nominal exchange-rate flexibility
for aiding short-run output stabilization. With short-run real wage rigidity, monetary policy
only affects resource allocation through its impact on nominal and real interest rates, hence
investment, as implied by equations 24 and 25. In this case, the benefits from sharing national
productivity risk internationally through fiscal insurance schemes would be greater than in the
Walrasian equilibrium of Section 2. But real wage rigidity also implies that the exchange rate
regime has little to do with the welfare benefits of introducing a fiscal insurance scheme.
4. Monetary union and fiscal insurance
Theadoptionofacommoncurrency reducesthecapacity ofmonetary authoritiestoinfluence
labor market clearing in each country separately. Under the assumptions made so far, nominal
exchange flexibility plays a key role for monetary stabilization with nominal wage rigidities. It
allows coordinated monetary policies to implement the same equilibrium as would be achieved
under perfectly flexible prices. The elimination of nominal exchange rate flexibility and adop-15
tion of a common monetary policy can increase the benefits of a system of international fiscal
insurancebetweenmemberstatesoftheEuropeanUnion. Thissectioncontinuestousethebasic
portfolio diversification model with idiosyncratic productivity shocks with the assumption that
nominal output prices are flexible while nominal wages are pre-determined.




















Financial market integratation implies that the nominal rate of interest faced by the residents of






where Mt is home money demand, M¤
t is foreign money demand and Ms
t is the common supply
of nominal balances. Equation 29 is written to allow for differences in consumer price levels,
Pt and P¤
t , respectively. Under the assumptions of the previous section (a single good and fully
integrated goods markets), these price levels are identical. The rest of the equations for the
household equilibrium are unchanged.
With pre-determined nominal wages, an increase in the money supply affects employment in
each country by raising the nominal price of output for each. The response of labor demand to


























where `t and `¤
t satisfy the labor demand equations for predetermined capital stocks. The output
of one country cannot be increased in response to an adverse asymmetric national productivity
shock without raising the output of every member state of the monetary union. Monetary ex-
pansions and contractions can be used to stablize output against common productivity shocks.
Using the common monetary policy to stabilize employment in one country in the presence of
asymmetric productivity shocks will destablize employment for the other member states.16
As a realistic objective for monetary policy under the Euro, let the money supply respond
to common aggregate shocks but not to idiosyncratic regional productivity disturbances. This
allows a comparison of the impact of asymmetric shocks on national output under monetary
union with that under a system of national monetary policies with flexible nominal exchange
rates that seeks to stabilize employment. Under the flexible exchange rate regime, the national

















Under monetary union, an idiosyncratic shock does not lead to a change in the price level and
only the second equality holds.
For an adverse asymmetric productivity shock, output falls by more under monetary union
than under national currencies with monetary policy coordination. How much more determines
the increase in the welfare benefits of fiscal insurance. It also depends on the elasticity of labor
supply with respect to real wages, ´ =
À0(`¡`t)
(`¡`t)À00(`¡`t). If labor is perfectly elastic, there is no
difference between the effect of asymmetric shocks on output with or without monetary union.
Therefore, if labor supplies are fairly elastic in the short run, monetary unification will have a
small impact on the capacity of governments to stabilize output against temporary asymmetric
productivity disturbances.
Upper boundsonthecostsof monetary unification for stabilization withidiosyncratic shocks
can be characterized by assuming that increases in output volatility do not lead to responsive
changesinthestructureofproductionthroughtheallocationofinvestment. Asimplecalculation





under monetary union, the common monetary policy does not respond to asymmetric output
shocks, while with separate national currencies monetary policies are perfectly coordinated to
take advantage of nominal exchange rate flexibility in stabilizing output.
When separate money supplies are used to maintain labor market equilibrium, differentiation
of equation 30 for the Cobb-Douglas production function gives the response of equilibrium17




























Under monetary union, labor demand is determined by the equality of the real wage facing
producers and marginal productivity of labor,
Wt
Pt





with both the price level Pt and the nominal wage rate Wt remaining constant as µt varies.
This implies that the quantity µt`
¡®
t remains constant, and labor demand and output vary with

















If labor supply is perfectly elastic, then monetary does not affect short-run output volatility.
The other extreme is achieved if households supply labor perfectly inelastically. When mone-
tary policy responds to regional shocks, as in a constrained-efficient equilibrium with nominal
exchange rate flexibility, `t always equals the fixed supply of labor desired by households, and
output varies proportionately to µt. In that case, money supply increases and decreases have
the greatest impact on output when they are chosen to achieve labor market equilibrium. Under
monetary union without monetary accommodation of asymmetric shocks, labor demand varies
with productivity and output varies in proportion to µ
1=®
t . For a share of labor in GDP equal
to two-thirds, the percentage standard deviation of output is three times greater with monetary
unification than without if the labor supply elasticity equals zero and twice if the elasticity is
one.
Monetary unionshouldincreasethevariabilityofoutputunderasymmetricproductivity shocks.
The real returns to financial claims to shares of national output should consequently increase. If
the residents of each country held the optimal portfolio before the elimination of national cur-
rencies and intra-union exchange rates, then no further risk sharing opportunities arise. Each18
household would already be exposed only to aggregate risk and not to idiosyncratic risk. This
does not mean to say that the equilibrium without independent monetary policies is efficient.
Full diversification with perfectly flexible relative prices or the equivalent of perfectly coordi-
nated output stabilizing national monetary policies achieves a first-best allocation. With mon-
etary union, the labor market distortions due to nominal wage rigidity remain. This is because
monetary policies under a common currency cannot be used to clear all national labor markets
simultaneously.
A system of fiscal insurance cannot achieve the first-best either. Redistributing spending
power between the residents of different countries does not have an asymmetric effect on em-
ployment across borders with a single good. Therefore, state-contingent redistribution policies
cannot raise employment and output for one member state suffering an adverse productivity
shock without also raising for another country that is not.
Fiscal transfers can have differential effects on employment across countries in a monetary
union with more than one good if consumption demands vary with residence. State-contingent
redistributions of income change relative expenditures on different commodities. When the
home country experiences an adverse productivity shock and receives a fiscal transfer from the
foreign country, the relative price of home products generally rises in response to an increase
in demand if there is a home consumption-spending bias. This can cause domestic employ-
ment to rise and foreign employment to decrease. The common monetary policy can be used
to balance the effect on foreign employment. However, households smooth their consumption
intertemporally. A fiscal transfer to the home country made contingent on a low realization of
µt represents an increase in the permanent income of the home country, so that demand for the
home country’s consumption bundle rises in period t and in expectation for future periods. This
shifts investment during period t toward the home country because the expected future price of
home goods relative to foreign goods rises. The investment effects of the policy can be welfare
reducing. For example, suppose that productivity shocks are serially correlated. Then a fiscal
insurance scheme in a monetary union will tend to destabilize output.19
This contrasts with how a monetary transfer to home residents under a flexible exchange rate
serves to raise home output to clear the home labor market. In that case, a money transfer leads
to an increase in the home currency price level, raising the nominal producer price and labor
demand. Theincreaseinthevalueof outputproducedinthehomecountry raisesrealincomefor
both countries equiproportionately with unconstrained asset trade. Therefore, output stabilizing
monetary policies increase the relative supply of home goods without changing the distribution
of real income across households with hetergeneous tastes. For homothetic preferences, the
relative price of home goods falls. That is, a monetary expansion causes a nominal and real
depreciation. If risk sharing is incomplete due to the inability of households to sell claims to
labor income, then aggregate spending patterns are affected by national monetary policies. But
in this case, the constrained optimum can be achieved using monetary policies.
Fiscal insurance schemes under monetary union do not replicate the allocation of resources
that can be implemented under flexible exchange rates. As pointed out, this schemes introduce
a distortion to capital accumulation because they affect employment by changing the pattern of
consumer spending acrosstradablecommoditiesandover time. If householdportfoliosarefully
diversified internationally a priori, thenthewelfarebenefit of increased employment isreduced,
possibly reversed, by the welfare costs of investment distortions.
It was demonstrated in Section 2 that fiscal insurance is a first-best policy instrument if the
constraint on international portfolio diversification (caused by the absence of trade in labor
income-based assets) was a priori binding. With each labor market clearing in every period,
fiscal insurance exactly filled the role of the missing market in claims to labor earnings. That is,
fiscal transfers are equivalent to dividend payments on GDP-based assets. To attain an efficient
allocation, if the constraint on asset trade is binding in a market equilibrium, these transfers
simply match the shares of labor income that would be paid to the residents of each country by
the other country in a fully-diversified Pareto-optimum. The introduction of a state-contingent
transfer scheme does affect the pattern of consumption spending and investment with more than
one good and home consumption bias. These effects, however, are consistent with full portfolio20
diversification and efficient equilibrium investment in each sector for each country.
With nominal wage rigidities and monetary union, a fiscal insurance scheme can provide the
benefits of increased risk sharing if the constraint on diversification by households binds. It
can also reduce labor market disequilibrium. In this case, it is one policy instrument seeking to
addresstwodistortions. Thissuggeststhatthebenefitsof fiscal insuranceintheabsenceof trade
in claims to future labor earnings are increased by monetary union. That is, support is found
here for the argument that monetary union raises the incentives to introduce interregional fiscal
insurance. The importance of these welfare benefits depends on the how responsive relative
prices are to fiscal redistribution, the elasticity of output supplies and marginal propensity to
consume from permanent income.
Theempirical observationsthatinternationalrisksharing ismuchlessextensivethanfeasible
with existing markets contradicts this line of thinking. Suppose that the portfolio diversification
observed is optimal subject to transactions costs (for exactness, assume these to be convex); the
marginal benefit of increasing the holding of shares in the foreign country’s capital stock just
equals the marginal cost of doing so for home country residents. As shown above, the variance
of share returns rises with monetary union. Therefore, households will diversify their portfolios
more after monetary union than before, and the same marginal condition for optimal household
portfolio selection will hold. So, what happens if a fiscal insurance scheme is added? It distorts
investment decisions relative to what they are under the optimal portfolio selection of house-
holds facing transactions costs. Taking the degree of diversification of savings in international
assetmarketsasrevealedpreferredby householdsgivenunobservedtransactionsorsimilarcosts
(assuming these are convex) implies that fiscal insurance has a negative welfare effect through
investmentthatcouldoffsetthebenefitsofstabilizingcurrentoutputagainstasymmetricregional
shocks.21
5. Monetary union and the need for fiscal insurance with market
segmentation
Deviations from purchasing power parity and the law of one price for many individual trad-
able goods are well-documented. Goldberg and Knetter [1997] survey the empirical evidence
that goods are priced to market, and there are many models of pricing with market segmentation
that rationalize failures of the law of one price for traded goods (see Feenstra [1995]). Most re-
cently, Engel and Rogers [1998] find that relative prices are more volatile across borders within
the European Union than within each country controlling for transport and other transactions
costs using distance.7 Essentially, the domestic currency prices of consumer goods in the Eu-
ropean Union respond slowly to exchange rate changes and are much less volatile that nominal
exchange rates.
Adding incomplete exchange-rate pass-through turns out to reduce the welfare costs of mon-
etary unification with nominal rigidities. With commodity market segmentation, nominal ex-
change rate flexibility becomes less important for enabling short-run monetary stabilization of
national outputs in the presence of idiosyncratic productivity disturbances. By explaining these
claims, this section shows that the case for a system of fiscal insurance as a replacement for sep-
arate monetary policies under monetary union is further reduced. It also shows that the extent
to which goods and services markets are integrated across borders is an important concern for
assessing the welfare case against monetary union.
In the model, the failure of exchange-rate pass-through means that equation 26 no longer
holds. Again, nominal rigidities are represented by assuming that nominal wages are set one-
period in advance of employment and that nominal goods prices are flexible so that real wages
can respond to changes in the supply of money. All the other equilibrium conditions of the basic
model with nominal wage rigidities hold for either a flexible exchange rate regime or monetary
union, as appropriate. Resource allocation under flexible exchange rates is discussed first.
In the absence of exchange-rate pass-through, exchange rate fluctuations do not directly
change consumer relative prices, but they can affect national income through the return to equi-22
ties calculated in terms of the appropriate consumption price index for shareholders. Let wages
be set in domestic currency and consumption take place at domestic currency prices. The value
of a claim on a firm’s capital depends on the proportions of output that are sold at home and
abroad. The total revenue in domestic currency units of home production if firms do not hedge
against exchange rate risk is given by
p
p





t indicates the producer price index for period t and xt equals gross exports. Nominal
wages are given by




and the net returns to capital equal (pt(1 ¡ xt) + stp¤
txt)µtf0(kt). The earnings of foreign cap-













competition and market segmentation could be used to model pricing behavior in each national
market, but it would unnecessarily complicate the exposition matters. Assume that imports and
exports are imperfect substitutes, so that ct = Á(c1t;c2t) is the home country’s consumption in-
dex defined over home and foreign goods, respectively. With prices set in each market, adverse
productivity shockswill tendtobeassociatedwithdomesticcurrency depreciationwithseparate
currencies (thisdependsonthe endogenousmonetary policy response). If this correlationholds,
thevariability offirmearningscanbereducedby internationalgoodsmarketsegmentation. With
currency-adjusted producer prices unequal across borders, nominal and other financial shocks
cancreatesignificantexchange-rateriskfor firmssothatthey haveanincentivetohedgeagainst
exchange risk in financial markets. Hedging does not affect the arguments made here.














































is the return to home country capital in terms of home consumption. Capital goods can be taken
as identical composites of the two commodities for each country. The equations imply that
exchange rate flexibility reduces the variance of the returns to households’ holdings of equity
claims in terms of their consumption bundle with respect to productivity shocks.

























































































and uncovered interest parity (equation 25).
The consumer price indices, Pt and P¤
t , for each country depend on the domestic prices of
the two goods as








respectively. With goods market segmentation, nominal wage rigidity and nominal goods prices
flexible, the real wage rates in each country can adjust independently of each other even if the
exchange rate is permanently fixed. That is, with the exchange rate constant, nominal interest
rates, i¤
t+1 and it+1, are equal, but Pt and P¤
t can move separately and p1t and p2t do not have to
equal stp¤
1t and stp¤
2t, respectively, through continuous goods market arbitrage. With a perma-
nently fixed nominal exchange rate, the real exchange rate defined in terms of consumer price
indices, Pt=P¤
t , can still change with the common money supply to clear both labor markets
simultaneously.
Two essential assumptions are being made here. The first is that nominal wages are preset in
each country but nominal goods prices are not. A monetary expansion immediately increases24
the nominal price level through money market clearing, which in turn translates into a rise in
the nominal producer price of output lowering the real wage rate for the firm. The second
is pricing-to-market. The relative prices p1t=p¤
1t and p2t=p¤
2t are endogenous. The addition of
pricing-to-market leads to the conclusion that monetary union does not affect the capacity of
monetary authorities to influence resource allocation in the presence of asymmetric national
productivity shocks. Under these conditions, the welfare benefits of fiscal insurance are identi-
cal withor without monetary union. Asymmetricproductivity shocksprovidethesamebasisfor
introducing state-contingent international fiscal transfers before the elimination of national cur-
rencies as after. The observed absence of exchange-rate pass-through argues against the claim
that fiscal insurance is needed to compensate for the loss of nominal exchange rate flexibility
under monetary union.
For the United States, the evidence suggests there are nominal rigidities but that nominal
pricesandwagesarenothighly correlated. Nominalwageandpricemovementsaremorehighly
correlated within each member state of the European Union. Real wages are more rigid in
Europe than in North America.8 Movements in the prices of consumer goods and services are
imperfectly correlated across regions of the United States and between European countries.
Introducing correlations between nominal wages and nominal prices allows nominal ex-
change rate flexibility to serve an essential role for the efficacy of monetary policy in short-
run adjustment under pricing-to-market. With real wage flexibility and pricing-to-market, the
nominal producer prices in one country can move independently of producer prices in the other
through uncorrelated movements in national consumer price levels under a common currency.
In this case, nominal exchange rate flexibility is an additional way to achieve the same ad-
justment in real wage rates but a redundant instrument of policy. If real wages are indexed to
national consumer prices, then producer prices can adjust independently of each other through
international trade receipts expressed in domestic currency. The second term in the expression,
p
p
t = p1t(1 ¡ xt) + stp¤
1txt, rather than the first allows producer real wages to adjust, although
equations 35 and 36 show that the labor market does not clear because household real wages are25
rigid. Flexible exchange rates and separate currency are a partial substitute for real wage flexi-
bility when there is pricing-to-market. Their usefulness in this regard rises with the openness of
national economies conditional on the degree of goods market integration.
This suggests that nominal exchange rate flexibility reduces the cost of real wage rigidity
for allocative efficiency. The adoption of a common currency should raise the welfare costs of
indexing nominal wages to the price level. If the result of monetary union for Europe is a signif-
icant reduction in the extent of real indexation, then monetary policy could end up being more
effective as a tool of short-run stabilization. With nominal goods prices flexible and markets
in similar goods incompletely arbitraged across regions, regional asymmetries will yield asym-
metric short-run real wage movements in response to a common monetary policy. On the other
hand, if real wage rigidity persists under monetary union, then the benefits of a fiscal insurance




sive changes in the model structure enable us to understand how fiscal insurance and monetary
unificationaffectresourceallocationinthepresenceofrealproductivity disturbances. Thishelps
to identify possible rationale for the idea that fiscal insurance is needed to compensate for in-
dependent monetary policies as an instrument for short-run output stabilization with aymmetric
national productivity shocks.
The monetary economy with perfectly flexible prices provides a benchmark for understand-
ing the welfare gains from international fiscal insurance for diversifying the idiosyncratic share
of production risk. In the model, international asset markets are incomplete in the sense that
households cannot trade claims to future labor income. The benefits of introducing fiscal in-
surance in this case are the same as the benefits from further international diversification of
household asset portfolios, so that these only arise if the constraint on asset trade is binding.26
Section 3 showed that introducing nominal rigidities with separate national currencies and flex-
ible exchange rates did not change the welfare economics of fiscal insurance. By comparing the
implications of the model with the empirical observation of a strong home bias in the portfolio
allocationofnationalsaving, theanalysispredictsnoincentivetointroducefiscalinsurancewith
independent monetary policies.
Monetary union can raise the benefits for allocative efficiency that can be gained from a sys-
temofinterregionalfiscalinsurance. Thisfollowsfromthewell-understoodpointthatacommon
monetary policy cannot achieve labor market equilibrium in each member country with asym-
metric productivity shocks. However, fiscal insurance does not replace coordinated separate
monetary policies. It brings additional distortions to the allocation of resources intertemporally
that must be counted against the potential gains. As shown in Section 4, the strongest case for
fiscal insurance arises when markets for goods and services are internationally integrated and
real wages are responsive to money supplies.
Thenext embellishment of themodel allowsgoods marketstonot bearbitraged continuously
across member states of the monetary union. This is an empirically important case as many
studiesof exchange-ratepass-throughhavedemonstrated. Monetary uniondoesnotincreasethe
welfare case for fiscal insurance with pricing-to-market in the absence of indexation of nominal
wages to nominal price levels. The model also implies that market segmentation within the
European community may enable the current flexible exchange rate regime to aid labor market
equilibrium in a restricted way despite rigid real wages in terms of domestic consumer prices.
However, wage indexation does not provide a convincing argument that monetary union will
raise the benefits of fiscal insurance under consumer market segmentation.
This paper concentrates on the role of fiscal insurance schemes in replacement of nominal
exchange rate flexibility in the presence of asymmetric productivity disturbances. Others have
considered the macroeconomic benefits of monetary union for providing fiscal and monetary
discipline (see McKinnon [1997], for example) or eliminating the adverse effects of nominal
and financial market disturbances for allocative efficiency (see Buiter [1997], for example).27
Another argument that fiscal insurance schemes may be inessential for promoting allocative ef-
ficiency withnominalrigiditiesandasymmetricrealshocksisgivenby BuiterandKletzer[1997]
and Kletzer [1997]. In an overlapping generations framework, they show that fiscal insurance
may add little if anything to the capacity of policy instruments already available to national
fiscal authorities for alleviating short-run disequilibrium due to temporary nominal rigidities.
Eichengreen [1997] provides a political-economy perspective that fiscal federalism may not be
necessary under European monetary union.28
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Endnotes
1The theory of optimum currency areas is further elaborated by McKinnon [1963], Kenen
[1969], Ingram [1973] and Ishiyama [1975].
2These include Bayoumi and Masson [1994], Bayoumi and Thomas [1995], De Grauwe
and Vanhaverbeke [1991], Dehesa andKrugman[1993], Eichengreen [1992a], Eichengreen and
Wyplosz [1993], Kenen [1992], Krugman [1993], Melitz [1991] and van Hagen and Hammond
[1995]. Most recently, Obstfeld [1997a and 1997b] and Obstfeld and Peri [1998] have reviewed
the empirical evidence for and against European monetary unification.
3McKinnon [1997a and b] is supportive of limitations on public sector debts and deficits as
set forth in the Treaty of Maastricht and subsequently tightened in the Stability Pact. Criticisms
of these restrictions are given by Buiter and Kletzer [1991], Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini [1993]
andEichengreenandvonHagen[1995]. Anoverviewisgivenby HutchisonandKletzer[1997].
4Sachs and Sala-i-Martin [1992] estimate interstate fiscal transfers in response to aggregate
income shocks for the United States. Von Hagen [1990] argues that these overestimate the role
of fiscal federalism in stabilization by including permanent interstate income transfers.
5Examplesinthe economicsliteratureinclude van Rompuy, AbrahamandHeremans[1991],
Eichengreen [1992a], Courchene [1993] and Bayoumi and Masson [1994].
6Neumeyer [1998] considers the effects of monetary unification in a general equilibrium
model with incomplete markets adopting a special specification for household utilities and in-
corporating the transactions demand for money differently.
7Engel and Rogers [1998] also discuss the usefulness of nominal exchange rate flexibility in
an IS-LM version of the Mundell-Fleming model.
8See, for example, Eichengreen [1992a] for typical comparisons of wage-price correlations.